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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The facts and procedure relevant to this appeal are set forth in the Appellant’s brief, 
and are based on the record and the factual findings by the trial court, respectively.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 1-3 (citing R., pp. 76-86).)  Cota-Medina does not rely on the facts 
found by the trial court.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 1-3 (citing to the transcript and the Waiver 
Report).)  Because Cota-Medina asserts some facts contrary to those found by the 
magistrate without claiming (much less showing) clear error, this Court must reject Cota-
Medina’s asserted facts where they are inconsistent with the facts found by the trial court.  
See Crosby v. Rowand Mach. Co., 111 Idaho 939, 942, 729 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(“The party challenging a judge’s finding of fact has the burden of showing clear error.”). 
 For example, Cota-Medina asserts as fact: “Although the Juvenile suspected that 
they were transporting drugs, he did not know how much or what had been placed in 
Camacho’s vehicle.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 2 (citing Tr., p. 109).)  The district court 
specifically found that Cota-Medina’s “denial of knowledge of concealed drugs is not 
credible.”  (R., p. 79.)   
 Cota-Medina also argues that the Waiver Report provided information about Cota-
Medina’s living arrangements, education, and independence from his parents that is 
“[c]ontrary to the magistrate’s finding[s].”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-3.)  However, the 
district court also considered Cota-Medina’s statements to the police and other evidence.  
(R., p. 80.)  Cota-Medina has failed to show any clear error in the trial court’s factual 
findings based on conflicting evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That None Of The Relevant Factors 
Favored Waiver As A Matter Of Law 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The magistrate concluded that the first four factors in I.C. § 20-508(8) “weigh 
heavily in favor of waiving jurisdiction” while the other factors were neutral or do “not 
weigh greatly against it.”  (R., pp. 82-85.)  The district court concluded that none of the 
factors weigh in favor of waiving juvenile jurisdiction as a matter of law.  (R., p. 221.)  
Review, however, shows that the magistrate faithfully followed the statutory language 
while the district court erroneously substituted its own opinions for the language of the 
statute and the trial court’s weighing of the factors.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-13.)   
 Cota-Medina argues that the district court correctly interpreted the statute.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 4-16.)  Review shows that the district court applied standards 
inconsistent with the language of the applicable statute while the magistrate applied the 
correct legal standards, and therefore the district court erred on intermediate appeal by 
reversing the magistrate’s waiver order.   
 
B. The Seriousness Of The Offense And Whether The Protection Of The Community 
Requires Isolation Of The Juvenile Beyond That Afforded By Juvenile Facilities1 
 
 The trial court concluded that Cota-Medina was charged with a serious offense 
because the legislature had provided a sentence of up to life with a mandatory minimum 
sentence of three years for trafficking in two grams or more of heroin, and the evidence 
indicated Cota-Medina had trafficked in 85 times that amount.  (R., p. 82.)  It cited law that 
                                            
1 I.C. § 20-508(8)(a). 
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the legislature may “‘rationally and legitimately’” conclude that delivering larger amounts 
of drugs “‘creates greater harm and a greater threat to society’” than delivering lesser 
amounts.  (R., p. 82 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 57, 
966 P.2d 53, 57 (Ct. App. 1998).)  Furthermore, given the high sentence needed for 
punishment and deterrence of even the basic trafficking amount, a maximum juvenile 
sentence of 180 days or commitment to the Department of Juvenile Correction until Cota-
Medina turned 21 (about three years) did not adequately protect the community.  (R., 
pp. 82-83.)  This analysis is entirely consistent with the statutory language of the factor—
“The seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
isolation of the juvenile beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities”—and was a proper 
exercise of discretion.  I.C. § 20-508(8)(a). 
 In contrast, the district court reasoned that, as matter of law, a trafficker who is a 
mere “mule,” as opposed to a “kingpin,” does not commit a serious offense as defined in 
the waiver statute.  (R., pp. 221-23.)   Cota-Medina repeats this argument, asserting that 
the state must “demonstrate something exceptional about this crime and this juvenile before 
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 10.)  This argument has no basis 
in the language of the statute.   
 Cota-Medina also argues that “[t]he language of the statute refers to the juvenile, 
not a hypothetical juvenile.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 8.)  The state agrees, but that does not 
show error by the trial court.  The magistrate looked at the seriousness of the crime Cota-
Medina was charged with and whether the juvenile sentences potentially applicable to 
Cota-Medina would protect the community.  (R., pp. 82-83.)  It was not some hypothetical 
juvenile who “drove a load car from Arizona to Idaho with over EIGHTY-FIVE times the 
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amount of heroin that would require a court to impose a mandatory fixed minimum prison 
sentence of fifteen years.”  (R., p. 82 (emphasis original).)  Nor was it a hypothetical 
juvenile who “would face a maximum of 180 days of detention and/or being committed to 
the legal custody of the Department of Juvenile Corrections until age 21.”  (R., p. 83.)  Nor 
was it some hypothetical juvenile’s story that “he was casually recruited to engage in this 
crime by a man he met at a party” that the trial court found “incredible.”  (R., p. 83.)  Cota-
Medina’s argument that the magistrate considered only a hypothetical juvenile and not the 
facts relevant to him is directly contrary to the record. 
 
C. Whether The Alleged Offense Was Committed In An Aggressive, Violent, 
Premeditated, Or Willful Manner2 
 
 The magistrate court concluded this factor weighed in favor of waiver on the basis 
that the crime was premediated and willful.  (R., pp. 83-84.)  The court’s factual findings 
underpinning that conclusion were that Cota-Medina “recruited Camacho’s help,” made 
“arrangements to secrete the heroin in the car,” “knew he was transporting illegal drugs,” 
“expected to [be] paid,” “obtained cocaine to help him stay awake on the drive to Idaho,” 
and “pre-arrange[d] a communication strategy” with Ramirez to arrange a location for the 
sale.  (R., p. 83.)  The magistrate found the crime was not the result of “being in the wrong 
place at the wrong time” or of “sudden impulsive behavior.”  (R., p. 83.)  The trial court’s 
determination that the alleged offense was committed in a premeditated or willful manner 
is supported by the record and consistent with its discretion. 
 The district court concluded that the alleged offense was not committed in a 
premeditated or willful manner as a matter of law because the words “premeditated” or 
                                            
2 I.C. § 20-508(8)(b). 
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“willful” as used in the statute “cannot merely refer to the manner in which the crime was 
committed, but rather to the manner in which the juvenile carried out that crime,” which, 
in context, required an “element of force or fear.”  (R., p. 224.)  Cota-Medina repeats that 
argument.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 11-12.)   Nothing in the statutory language requires 
drawing a distinction (if such is even possible) between “the manner in which the crime 
was committed” and “the manner in which the juvenile carried out that crime.”  Even less 
suggests that the statute requires the court to find “force or fear” in order to find the alleged 
crime to have been committed in a “premeditated” or “willful” manner.   
The magistrate found a degree of planning and preparation that showed the crime 
was premediated and willful and belied any claim that the crime was committed 
impulsively or inadvertently.  This finding supports the magistrate’s exercise of discretion 
in weighing this factor in favor of waiver. 
 
D. Whether The Alleged Offense Was Against Persons Or Property, Greater Weight 
Being Given To Offenses Against Persons3 
 
 Under the plain language of this statutory factor, crimes against persons or property 
weigh in favor of waiver, with greater weight given to offenses against persons.  I.C. § 20-
508(8)(c).  The magistrate concluded heroin trafficking was “an offense against persons” 
because of “the danger that drugs present to the public.”  (R., p. 84.)  Cota-Medina argues 
that heroin trafficking is a victimless crime, akin to inattentive driving, because there were 
no “actual victims” as opposed to “hypothetical ones.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 13.)  As 
stated by the Court of Appeals in the case cited by the magistrate, the high sentences 
imposed upon drug trafficking crimes (as opposed, for example, to inattentive driving) 
                                            
3 I.C. § 20-508(8)(c). 
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derive from the rational and legitimate determination by the legislature that drug trafficking 
causes great harm to society.  State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 57, 966 P.2d 53, 57 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  Because society is made of persons, trafficking is a crime against persons.  
That police intercepted the heroin before it entered anyone’s veins did not render this crime 
victimless.  The magistrate did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion by 
concluding that the crime of trafficking in heroin is not victimless. 
 
E. The Maturity Of The Juvenile As Determined By Considerations Of His Home, 
Environment, Emotional Attitude, And Pattern Of Living4 
 
 The magistrate found Cota-Medina’s maturity “on par” with that of a young adult 
because of his biological age, his choice to leave school and live independent of his parents, 
the lack of a need for significant adult guidance in his life, that his choice to get involved 
in the drug trade was motivated by a desire to make money, and he demonstrated 
“sophistication, and knowledge of the significant consequences of being caught.”  (R., 
pp. 84-85.)  The district court determined, and Cota-Medina argues on appeal, that the 
magistrate erred by considering his biological age.  (R., p. 227 (issue is not age, but 
“exceptionalism”); Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15 (arguing for “presumption” that age-
appropriate maturity weighs against waiver).)  Although biological age is not specifically 
included in the statutory language of this factor, it is certainly relevant to the question of 
maturity. 
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a fact of consequence “more 
probable.”  I.R.E. 401.  Evidence that Cota-Medina was within three months of his 
eighteenth birthday was relevant to determining his maturity.  Moreover, the magistrate 
                                            
4 I.C. § 20-508(8)(d). 
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specifically considered Cota-Medina’s “home environment, emotional attitude, and pattern 
of living” along with his biological age when evaluating this factor.  (R., pp. 84-85.)  The 
district court erred when concluding that this factor could not weigh in favor of Cota-
Medina’s waiver as a matter of law. 
 
F. The District Court Erred 
 
This Court directly reviews the district court’s appellate decision “to determine 
whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on appeal.”  Borley v. Smith, 
149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010).  “An order waiving juvenile jurisdiction is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”  Zamora v. State, 123 Idaho 192, 194, 
846 P.2d 194, 196 (1992).  “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review.”  Simono v. House, 160 Idaho 788, 791, 379 P.3d 1058, 
1061 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).  Review shows that the district court did not 
correctly decide the issue presented on appeal because the magistrate court did not abuse 
its discretion and because the district court substituted its own personal view of the proper 
standards for waiving juveniles into adult court for the legislative intent expressed in the 
plain language of the statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s decision on 
appeal and affirm the magistrate’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction. 
 DATED this 29th day of September, 2017. 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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